We are constantly exposed to socially conflicting situations in everyday life, and cognitive flexibility is essential for adaptively coping with such difficulties. Flexible goal choice and pursuit are not exclusively conscious, and therefore cognitive flexibility involves both explicit and implicit forms of processing. However, it is unclear how individual differences in explicit and implicit aspects of flexibility are associated with neural activity in a resting state. Here, we measured intrinsic fractional amplitude of low-frequency fluctuations (fALFF) by resting-state functional magnetic imaging (RS-fMRI) as an indicator of regional brain spontaneous activity, together with explicit and implicit aspects of cognitive flexibility using the Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS) and Implicit Association Test (IAT). Consistent with the dual processing theory, there was a strong association between explicit aspects of flexibility (CFS score) and "rationalism" thinking style and between implicit aspects (IAT effect) and "experientialism." The level of explicit flexibility was also correlated with fALFF values in the left lateral prefrontal cortex, whereas the level of implicit flexibility was correlated with fALFF values in the right cerebellum. Furthermore, the fALFF values in both regions predicted individual preference for flexible decision-making strategy in a vignettes simulation task. These results add to our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying flexible decision-making for solving social conflicts. More generally, our findings highlight the utility of RS-fMRI combined with both explicit and implicit psychometric measures for better understanding individual differences in social cognition.
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INTRODUCTION
To support your family, would you prioritize profit and monetary gain despite being treated unfairly? We are constantly exposed to such psychologically, ethically, and socially conflicting situations in everyday life, and cognitive flexibility is necessary for adaptive coping (Milders et al., 2008; Ravizza and Carter, 2008; Wakusawa et al., 2015) .
The dual processing theory posits two different modes of processing; one is explicit, rational, analytic, and conscious, and the other is implicit, experiential, intuitive, and unconscious (Evans, 2008; Lieberman, 2007) . Flexible goal choice and pursuit are not exclusively rational and conscious (Custers and Aarts, 2010) , but may also heavily rely on experiential learning and implicit processing. In this line, a recent article argued that individual differences in thinking styles (e.g., rational versus experiential) represent discrete behavioral patterns of flexible adaptation (Kozhevnikov et al., 2014 ).
To date, task functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have shown that diverse brain regions are involved in flexible decision-making. For example, previous studies on healthy population have shown that frontoparietal network plays a key role in perceptual aspect of flexible behavior (Douw et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2011; Sekutowicz et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2004 ). In addition, clinical studies reported that patients with psychiatric disorders [e.g., autism spectrum disorder (ASD), obsessive-compulsive disorder] showed altered activation in brain regions, such as lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC), inferior parietal cortex, ventral striatum, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and cerebellum, compared to healthy subjects while performing tasks related to flexibility, which might be associated with their impaired cognitive-behavioral flexibility (Geurts et al., 2009; Gu et al., 2008; Zastrow et al., 2009) . However, it is unclear how individual differences in trait-level explicit and implicit aspects of flexibility are associated with neural activity in a resting state.
Resting-state neuroimaging modalities can provide useful information regarding stable neural characteristics without being confounded by components unique to functional tasks (He et al., 2014; Karoly et al., 2013; Lai and Wu, 2015; Raichle, 2010 , Xu et al., 2015 . For this reason, intrinsic spontaneous brain activity measured by resting-state fMRI (RS-fMRI) has been widely used in recent years to explore the neural correlates of dispositional traits (Fox and Raichle, 2007; Markett et al., 2013; Wei et al., 2014) . Furthermore, individual differences in spontaneous brain activity may reflect distinct experiences and learning histories (Lewis et al., 2009; Vahdat et al., 2011) . Thus, we hypothesized that dispositional variation in cognitive flexibility could be explained by regional differences in the intensity of spontaneous brain activity. Here we focused on fractional amplitude of low-frequency fluctuations (fALFF) as an indicator of the intensity of spontaneous brain activity (Zou et al., 2008) . The fALFF approach improves the ALFF approach, with better sensitivity and specificity for detecting spontaneous brain activity (Zou et al., 2008) . For instance, the fALFF is found to correlate with individual differences in empathy (Cox et al., 2012) , Stroop task performance (Takeuchi et al., 2015) , and personality traits (e.g., extraversion) (Wei et al., 2014) .
Among the brain areas related to flexible decision-making, the LPFC has been consistently reported to play vital roles in deliberate reasoning by interpreting incoming information during explicit reinforced leaning, capacities crucial for cognitive flexibility (Fujino et al., 2016; Koechlin et al., 2003; Oaksford, 2015; Tanji et al., 2007) . In contrast, the ventral striatum is considered essential for implicit leaning by trial and error (Ito et al., 2015; Wilkinson et al., 2014) . In addition, cerebellar activity has been observed repeatedly during implicit social emotional learning tasks, suggesting that the role of the cerebellum in implicit processing may not be limited to perceptual domains but also extend to cognitive/social domains (Lam et al., 2013; Van Overwalle et al., 2014) . Based on the close association of cognitive flexibility with such learned processing capacities (Kehagia et al., 2010) , we predicted that explicit aspects of flexibility would be associated with spontaneous brain activity in areas important for explicit learning, whereas implicit aspects of flexibility would be associated with activity in areas important for implicit learning.
In this study, we first estimated individual explicit aspects of flexibility using the self-report Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS; Martin and Rubin, 1995) and implicit aspects by the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) . Subsequently, we identified brain regions where spontaneous brain activity (fALFF values) was associated with dispositional variation in explicit or implicit aspects of flexibility. We also assessed the relationships between these two types of flexibility and individual differences in thinking style and personality traits. Finally, to confirm that the identified spontaneous brain activity patterns influence practical flexible decision-making, we applied a vignettes simulation task involving realistic socially conflicting situations (Brady and Wheeler, 1996) , and performed regression analyses between task scores and regional brain activity measures.
We found that the level of explicit flexibility was associated with the rationalism thinking style and fALFF values in the left lateral prefrontal cortex, whereas the level of implicit flexibility was associated with experientialism and fALFF values in the right cerebellum. Furthermore, the fALFF values in both regions predicted individual preference for flexible decision-making strategy in a vignettes simulation task. These results add to our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying flexible decision-making for solving social conflicts.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES

Participants
Twenty-two volunteers recruited from among undergraduate and graduate students participated in this study [mean age: 21.4 ± 1.2 (S.D.) years; 6 females; 20 right-handed]. The sample size was determined based on previous fMRI studies of individual differences in attitudes or behavior that used IAT (Berlingeri et al., 2016; Suslow et al., 2010; Yi et al., 2014) . No volunteer met criteria for any psychiatric disorder according to the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID I), and none had a history of head trauma, neurological illness, serious medical or surgical illness, or substance abuse. Predicted IQ was 104.1 ± 8.3 as estimated using the Japanese Version of the National Adult Reading Test short form (Matsuoka and Kim, 2006 After a complete description of the study, written informed consent was obtained from each participant.
Explicit and implicit aspects of flexibility Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS)
As stated in the Introduction, we were interested in the role of cognitive flexibility particularly within a social context. Thus, we used the CFS, one of the most widely used questionnaires for assessing individual flexible choice tendencies in response to social conflict (Martin and Rubin, 1995; Oshiro et al., 2016) . A large number of previous studies have used CFS to assess cognitive flexibility (Cranmer and Martin, 2015; Curran and Andersen, 2017) , and its usefulness for assessing impairment of this ability in various psychiatric disorders such as ASD and anxiety disorders has also been reported (Lee and Orsillo, 2014; Okuda et al., 2017) . The CFS is a self-report scale consisting of 12 items, each rated on a 6-point Likert scale. The scale evaluates participants' awareness that there are alternative ways of behaving and their willingness and perceived ability to be flexible. Item responses are summed to an overall score ranging from 12 to 72, with higher scores indicating greater cognitive flexibility.
Implicit Association Test (IAT)
We applied the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) to measure implicit aspects of flexibility (Fig. 1) . The IAT is a widely validated approach to measuring individual differences in implicit aspects of personality and social cognition (Lane et al., 2007; Suslow et al., 2010 Suslow et al., , 2017 . The IAT comprises a series of response time tasks that require participants to classify word stimuli that appear at the lower portion of a computer screen into corresponding categories and paired attributes appearing in the upper left or right. The basic assumption of the IAT is that past learning experiences can be represented by the facilitation of information processing of associated concepts as measured by rate of processing and response time (Greenwald et al., 1998) . Response times are expected to be shorter when paired target category and attribute labels match a person's automatic associations. Conversely, response times are expected to be longer when paired target category and attribute labels contradict automatic associations.
To estimate individual differences in implicit aspects of flexibility under socially conflicting situation, the present IAT evaluated the extent to which participants associated fairness vs. unfairness (target categories) with profit vs. loss (attribute categories). In social circumstances, we often have to make difficult moral tradeoffs to maximize social welfare. It is well established that people are intrinsically averse to unfairness/inequality (in particular disadvantage type) (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Haruno and Frith, 2010) . However, successfully navigating social life often requires self-regulation in the face of perceived unfairness (Crocket, 2009) . For example, it is often necessary to accept unfair offers to maximize profit/welfare for oneself as well as others (Crockett et al., 2008; Reilly, 1998; Takahashi et al., 2012) . Therefore, socially flexible individuals who have developed, through social complexity, sophisticated strategies that balance competition and cooperation to achieve "deep pragmatism"
(higher social and reproductive success) are predicted to have formed a relatively weak automatic association between unfairness and negative valence. In other words, individuals who cannot easily separate themselves from moral percepts and have low tolerance of unfairness would tend to show much slower response times in the incongruent condition (i.e., fairness/loss for one response key, unfairness/profit for the other response key) compared to the congruent condition (i.e., unfairness/loss for one response key; fairness/profit for the other response).
Four items were selected as the to-be-sorted stimuli for each of the concepts. Stimuli from the fairness and unfairness categories were, respectively honesty, equality, neutrality, conscientiousness, and deviation, difference, irregularity, violation. Stimuli from the categories profit/loss were acquirement, benefit, positive, winning, and debt, waste, negative, cost, respectively. The present IAT comprised seven blocks according to the standard procedures (Greenwald et al., 1998) practice trials for an incongruent block with both reversed target categories and the attribute categories; and (block 7) 40 test trials for an incongruent block with both reversed target categories and the attribute categories. Participants were told they would be making a series of category judgments. On each trial, a stimulus word was displayed in the center of a computer screen. Category labels were displayed on the left and right sides of the window. Participants used the letter a on the left side and the letter l on the right side of the keyboard for their responses. They were told to be as accurate as possible, while also going as quickly as possible. An incorrect response led to a feedback of red "×." An inter-trial interval of 300 ms was used. The IAT was conducted using E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA).
Computation of the IAT effect as Greenwald's D score was conducted based on the improved scoring algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003; Lane et al., 2007) . No subjects showed latencies less than 300 ms in more than 10% of trials. Trials with latencies greater than 10000 ms were deleted. Each error latency was replaced by the mean + twice the S.D. of correct latencies within the same block. The mean latency in the trials of block 3 was subtracted from that of block 6. Similarly, the mean latency in the trials of block 4 was subtracted from that of block 7. Then, each difference score was divided by its associated trial S.D. of response latencies. The IAT effect (as measured by D score) was computed as the average of these two scores. Thus, a lower IAT effect implies greater implicit flexibility.
Thinking styles and personality traits
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI)
We used the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Naito et al., 2004; Pacini and Epstein, 1999) to measure individual differences in thinking styles. The REI reliably measures an individual's preference for two styles of thinking: need for cognition (rationalism) and faith in intuition (experientialism). There are 40 questions with 5-point response scales (20 each for rationalism and experientialism). All scores are averaged to provide variables ranging from 1 to 5, with a higher score reflecting a greater tendency to endorse the construct measured.
Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R)
We administered the Japanese version of the Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R) (Costa and MacCrae, 1992; Shimonaka et al., 1998) , one of the most widely used questionnaires for assessing broad personality traits. This self-report questionnaire comprises 240 items and contains five dimensional scales (neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness) that correspond to a five-factor personality trait model. Participants are asked to respond to each item by designating answers from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). NEO-PI-R results are presented as T scores with a mean of 50 and standard deviation (S.D.) of 10. Higher scores indicate higher levels of the particular trait.
Way of response in socially conflicting situations
To further examine flexibility, we applied a simulation (vignettes) task rather than additional psychological questionnaires. This vignettes task was developed by Brady and Wheeler (1996) , and involves socially conflicting situations that may happen in natural settings outside the laboratory. Brady and Wheeler (1996) categorized responses as "utilitarian" or "formalist," a well-known response contrast in socially conflicting situations. Utilitarian refers to the tendency to assess ethical situations flexibly prioritizing their consequences for people (result-oriented), while formalist represents the human tendency to assess ethical situations in terms of their consistent conformity to patterns, rules, or some other formal feature.
This task simultaneously monitors two forms of response to the vignettes: (1) the preference for a particular kind of solution and (2) the preference for reasoning in support of that solution. Participants are asked to read and simulate the seven vignettes about conflicting situation in daily life as a protagonist (the authors first adopted eight vignettes that elicited the greatest variation in responses during pilot studies, but one vignette concerning capital punishment was later dropped from analysis because the utilitarian−formalist distinction was unclear). Higher scores indicate stronger preference for a specific option. Based on the previous study (Brady and Wheeler, 1996) , we computed each participant's total tendency toward a particular solution-rationale combination by calculating the average of the participant's responses to each combination for all seven vignettes. The following vignette is an example of this task.
"You work for a state auditor's office which has a policy against accepting gifts from anyone with whom the state may have business. Your birthday is in one week, and a very good friend of your father's has just dropped by with a pair of fine leather gloves and a birthday card. This person also works for a construction firm which has built city facilities in the past . . ." (Yan and Zang, 2010) . In brief, for each subject, the skin-skull-stripping procedure was performed using the brain extraction tool from FSL (http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/) so that these parts were not treated as the outer edge of the brain parenchyma in the processing procedures. Images were manually oriented to the AC-PC line. Functional images were corrected for differences in slice-acquisition timing and were then spatially realigned to correct for head motion.
T1-weighted images were co-registered to EPI images and segmented into gray matter, white matter, and cerebrospinal fluid. To reduce the effects of physiological processes and head motion, we regressed out the motion parameters, white matter signal, cerebrospinal fluid signal, and global signal. The global signal is considered to reflect a combination of physiological processes (such as cardiac and respiratory fluctuations) and therefore was treated as a covariate to control for such factors. Although there is an ongoing debate about whether regressing out the global signal is beneficial or affects data detrimentally (Wong et al., 2012) , we applied global signal regression because previous studies have also shown that the global signal regression is effective in controlling movement-related artifacts in RS-fMRI data analyses (Klein et al., 2017; Power et al., 2012; Yan et al., 2013) . Functional images were spatially normalized to Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space (voxel size: 3 × 3 × 3) and then smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with a full width at half maximum of 6 mm in the x, y, and z axes. No participant exhibited head motion of more than 3.0 mm in any direction or 3.0° rotation throughout the resting-state scans.
Subsequently, the fALFF calculation was performed using DPARSFA. Although ALFF appears to be a promising method for detecting spontaneous brain activity, certain cisternal areas have also shown significantly higher ALFF, which is likely to occur because of physiological noise (Zou et al, 2008; Wang et al., 2012) . Thus, the fALFF approach was developed to selectively suppress the artifacts from non-specific brain areas, thereby significantly improving the sensitivity and specificity of spontaneous brain activity detection (Zou et al, 2008) . Consequently, we focused on fALFF in this study. Based on previous studies (Chyzhyk et al., 2015; Cox et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2017) , the fALFF value of each voxel was calculated for each participant. For the time series of each voxel, the sum of the amplitudes within a low-frequency range (0.01-0.1 Hz) was extracted. The fALFF was then computed as the fractional sum of the amplitudes within the low-frequency range divided by the sum of amplitudes across the entire frequency range (Chyzhyk et al., 2015; Cox et al., 2012; Yu et al., 2017) .
Based on previous studies (Lai and Wu, 2015; Wei et al., 2014) , the fALFF of each voxel was divided by the global mean fALFF value to standardize data across participants (the values were also obtained using the DPARSFA toolbox).
Data analyses Correlations between aspects of flexibility and thinking styles/personality traits
To examine if explicit and implicit aspects of flexibility are associated with specific thinking styles and personality traits, we performed correlational analyses between flexibility scores (CFS scores and IAT effect) and REI scores/T scores of five domains of NEO-PI-R. Correlation analysis was also performed between explicit aspects of flexibility (the CFS scores) and implicit aspects of flexibility (the IAT effect). None of our psychological measures datasets (scores from the CFS, IAT, REI, NEO-PI-R, and vignettes task) statistically violated the assumption of normality (all, p > 0.05, Shapiro-Wilk test). Behavioral data were analyzed using SPSS 21 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA). Results were considered statistically significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
Brain regions with fALFF values associated with explicit or implicit aspects of flexibility
To explore the brain regions where the fALFF values were associated with individual differences in explicit and implicit aspects of flexibility (i.e., CFS scores and the IAT effect, respectively) throughout the whole brain, we performed multiple regression analyses separately using a general linear model framework in SPM8 (Worsley and Friston, 1995) . Age and gender were entered into the model as covariates of no interest.
Clusters that survived the family-wise error (FWE) correction for multiple comparisons with a cluster-level p < 0.01 (height threshold T = 2.5) were reported. We interpreted the anatomical location of the clusters by consulting the Talairach Daemon database (http://www.talairach.org), the Anatomic Automatic Labeling toolbox, (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) and neuroanatomy atlas textbooks (Duvernoy, 1991; Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) .
Further examination of regional spontaneous brain activities associated with explicit/implicit aspects of flexibility
To confirm that identified regional brain activities practically influence flexible decision-making in socially conflicting situations, we performed regression analyses between the regional fALFF values (independent variables) and the scores measured on the vignettes task (dependent variables). As for the fALFF values, the parameter estimates were extracted as first eigenvariate from the significant clusters using the VOI function in SPM8. Results were considered statistically significant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
RESULTS
The mean D score (IAT effect) across all subjects was 0.66 ± 0.35 (S.D.), which is consistent with the notion that healthy individuals draw an automatic association between unfairness and negative valence. Individual D scores did not correlate with the CFS scores (explicit aspects of flexibility) (r = 0.16, p = 0.49). There was a strong correlation between individual CFS scores and the level of rationalism (r = 0.67, p < 0.001) and between the IAT effect and the level of experientialism (r = −0.56, p = 0.006) (Fig. 2) . The CFS scores were positively correlated with conscientiousness (r = 0.56, p = 0.007), while we did not find any significant correlations between IAT effects and the five factor scores on the NEO-PI-R (Table 1) . 
Additional analyses
To explore the effects of handedness, head motion, and IQ on the results, we performed additional analyses, which did not substantially influence our conclusions.
The details of these are as follows.
Handedness
Two participants were left-handed, as determined by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) 
Head motion
Although no participants met our exclusion criteria with respect to head motion (> 3.0 mm in translation or 3.0° of rotation) that were determined based on previous studies using fALFF (e.g., Chyzhyk et al., 2015; Yu et al., 2017) , two participants 
IQ
Although IQ did not significantly correlate with explicit or implicit flexibility (CFS scores or the IAT effect) across participants (both, p > 0.22), previous studies reported that intelligence was an important factor in cognitive flexibility (Colzato et al., 2006) . 
DISCUSSION
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the individual spontaneous neural activity patterns associated with dispositional variation in explicit and implicit aspects of flexibility. By combining psychometric measures of cognitive flexibility (CFS and the IAT) and predominant thinking style (REI) with RS-fMRI, we
showed that (1) the level of explicit cognitive flexibility was strongly associated with a rational thinking style and higher spontaneous neural activity (fALFF values) in the LPFC, and (2) the level of implicit flexibility was associated with an experiential thinking style and higher activity in the cerebellum.
Our findings support the notion that both rational and experiential (intuitive) thinking contribute to flexible behavior (Custers and Aarts, 2010; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; McNally et al., 2012) . Specifically, rational/explicit decision-making strategies impact conscious flexible behavior, while experiential/implicit strategies impact flexible behavior that operates outside conscious awareness.
The neural results suggest that the level of spontaneous neural activity in the LPFC and the cerebellum could explain individual differences in explicit and implicit aspects of flexibility, respectively. These findings also suggest that explicit and implicit aspects of flexibility may rely predominantly on different brain regions, and that individuals who exhibit greater flexibility have both higher-order rational decision-making capacity, a major function of the LPFC (Coutlee and Huettel, 2012; Hare et al., 2009; Mobbs et al., 2007) , as well as more highly developed experiential response capacity for flexible decisions. Indeed, complementary explicit and experiential learning histories are crucial for cognitive flexibility, and the cerebellum may be a major substrate for the latter (De Bartolo et al., 2009; Desmond and Fiez, 1998) . Furthermore, cerebellar lobule VI
showing the association in this study, has been reported to be involved in diverse dimensions of social cognition, such as mirroring and event/person mentalizing (Van Overwalle et al., 2014) . Cerebellar structural/functional abnormalities are found in a substantial proportion of patients with ASD, who often exhibit cognitive inflexibility in a broad range of situations Ito, 2008; Senju et al., 2009 ).
Specifically, implicit understanding of others (e.g., metalizing by visual information) or implicit detection of others' motivations are frequently diminished in ASD (Frith, 2001; Foti et al., 2015) . These implicit social skills may be stored in regions associated with implicit memory, and experience-based learning may cultivate implicit/experiential decision-making via neuroplasticity (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2011; Patterson et al., 2013) .
These roles of the LPFC and cerebellum in cognitive flexibility were supported by additional examination using the realistic vignettes task involving socially conflicting situations. That is, spontaneous brain activities in these regions were crucial variables explaining the preference for a specific decision type, utilitarian solution/formalist reasoning (decision type B). Individuals preferring this decision type tend to prioritize value-based choice (result-oriented) to resolve the conflicting situation together with the preference that rationally considered this issue in a manner of a formalist (i.e., rule-based that takes social norm into account) (Brady and Wheeler, 1996) . More specifically, both decision types A and B adopt utilitarian solution. However, while decision type A focused solely on utilitarian for solution and rational issue, type B flexibly switch their mind-set between utilitarian and formalist when thinking about these issues, depending on the given conflicting situation. Accordingly, the decision type B is a strategically flexible/adaptive response to maximize profit/welfare of oneself as well as others in socially conflicting situations. The current results support the notion that having well developed explicit and implicit systems may allow individuals to make such flexible decisions (Custers and Aarts, 2010; Koziol et al., 2010) .
Among brain regions implicated in previous task fMRI studies of flexible decision-making (e.g., prefrontal cortices, temporoparietal junction, striatum, ACC, cerebellum), spontaneous brain activity distinctively observed in the cerebellum could be due to its effect on long-term adaptive learning. Namely, by confronting conflicting and stressful situations, we gradually obtain cognitive flexibility traits experientially (Kehagia et al., 2010; Spiro, 1988) , and thus it requires relatively long time to cultivate our implicit aspects of flexibility. A recent study investigating neural substrates related to motor memory identified brain regions associated with multiple timescales in adaptation: in particular, the activity in the anterior-medial cerebellum, mainly located in the lobule VI identified in this study, was associated with memories for long timescales, while the prefrontal and parietal lobes and the posterior part of the cerebellum were associated with those for short timescales and the activity in the inferior parietal region was associated with those for intermediate timescales (Kim et al., 2015) . Our study is in line with the previous findings and supports the notion that the role of the cerebellum in implicit processing is not limited to perceptual domains but also extend to cognitive/social domains.
There are several limitations to this study. First, the sample size was small.
Additionally, 6 of the participants were females and 2 were left-handed, which limits the interpretation of the results. Thus, our preliminary findings should be interpreted cautiously and need to be carefully replicated in future research that recruits large number of subjects. In this regard, a recent study has shown that the effect size of the association between individual differences in cognitive abilities and RS-fMRI measures may be very small, and the authors stressed the importance of using a large sample size to increase the reliability of the results (Takeuchi et at., 2015) . Although all our psychological measures datasets were normally distributed (all, p > 0.05, Shapiro-Wilk test), the small sample size of this study limited the sufficient quantification of individual variability within these measures. In addition, we recruited our study subjects from graduate and undergraduate students to ensure a uniform socioeconomic status, which means that our findings may not be representative of individuals with different backgrounds or from different socioeconomic levels. Second, in this study, we focused on the role of cognitive flexibility in the social context, and thus we used the CFS, which examines individual flexible choice tendencies in response to social conflict.
However, cognitive flexibility also plays a role in non-social situations. In this respect, although CFS scores were reported to be significantly associated with other psychometric measures related to cognitive flexibility, such as the cognitive flexibility inventory (Dennis and Vander Wal, 2010) and the coping flexibility scale (Kato, 2012) , and recent studies reported a common neural basis underlying social and non-social aspects of cognitive flexibility (Krall et al., 2016; Tei et al., 2017) , our findings only contribute a partial explanation for the relationship between cognitive flexibility and spontaneous neural activity. It will be important to apply a variety of psychometric measures related to cognitive flexibility in the future. Third, in this study, we investigated the role of spontaneous brain activity from the point of functional segregation as indicated by fALFF, which has been used as a reliable and sensitive measure in the study of individual differences and personality traits (Kunisato et al., 2011; Takeuchi et al., 2015; Wei et al., 2014) . However, the human brain has two basic organizational principles: functional segregation and integration (Cole et al., 2013; Sporns et al., 2000) . In line with this notion, previous studies investigated functional connectivity patterns associated with various types of cognitive abilities using task-dependent and resting state fMRI (Caulfield et al., 2016; Cole et al., 2013) . In those studies, the roles of the LPFC and cerebellum in functional connectivity were also highlighted (Caulfield et al., 2016; Cole et al., 2013) . Future research on a large scale should combine the functional connectivity approach with that of fALFF for more in-depth insight into the neural mechanisms of individual differences in explicit and implicit aspects of cognitive flexibility. Fourth, we used lenient exclusion criteria with respect to head motion (> 3.0 mm in translation or 3.0° of rotation). Thus, our findings need to be carefully replicated using more restricted criteria in future research that recruits large number of subjects.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the current results add to our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying flexible decision-making for solving social conflicts.
More generally, our findings highlight the utility of RS-fMRI combined with both explicit and implicit psychometric measures for better understanding individual differences in social cognition.
Conclusions
In conclusion, the present study demonstrated that strong spontaneous activity in regions implicated in explicit and implicit learning (LPFC and cerebellum, respectively) mediated explicit and implicit aspects of cognitive flexibility for solving social conflicts.
Our findings highlight the utility of RS-fMRI combined with psychometric measures of both explicit and implicit forms of cognitive flexibility for better understanding the neural mechanisms underlying flexible decision-making. Fellowship (2011122786). These agencies had no further role in the study design, the collection, analysis and interpretation of data, the writing of the report, or in the decision to submit the paper for publication.
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